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In the following commentary I will first briefly review the target article, then voice
some critical points, and last offer a positive proposal according to which tension
in self-deception is a kind of a metacognitive feeling. Proust offers a novel, inspir-
ing view that feelings possess an indexical (non-conceptual) format, are transpar-
ent (that is,  they may be re-described in propositional terms, but not thereby
changed), and acquire valence if the rate of change towards fulfilling the given af-
fordance is greater or less than expected. In my critique I will first point to diffi -
culties in disentangling feelings from emotions, then try to provide a more precise
description of the formal object of feelings, along with some examples, and offer a
definition of “directness” that is consistent with predictive coding—as well as ar-
gue that feelings might be influenced by concepts even if they themselves are
non-conceptual. Last, I propose that tension in self-deception is a metacognitive
feeling.
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1 The expressive mode of feelings
First, I would like to repeat, in short, the main
claims of the target paper that will serve as a
basis for my subsequent comments and exten-
sions in the following sections.  Joëlle Proust’s
article is concerned with the functional and in-
formational characterisation of feelings. She ar-
gues that the concept of “feeling” consists of the
following components:
1. Reactive (associated with appraisal)
2. Subjective experience
3. With distinctive embodied phenomenal qual-
ity (somatic markers have the function of ex-
pressing  intensity  and  valence  of  feelings,
Proust this collection, p. 8)
4. Possessing a formal object (not always, e.g.,
feeling depressed; absence of a formal object
is typical of moods, footnote 5)
The formal object of feelings is argued to be af-
fordance-sensing, a “non-conceptual and entirely
subjective appraisal of the environment by the
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agent” (Proust this collection, p. 7) or a “sub-
jective, embodied relation to an opportunity in
an input from the environment” (p. 8). Assum-
ing the  non-referential  indexicality  of  feelings,
or that feelings signal a relational affordance (p.
7) that depends on the representational system
(p. 8), Proust argues that feelings can misrep-
resent only if they are re-described in proposi-
tional terms. She argues that feelings are trans-
parent,  because  of  the  experienced  connection
between their somatic markers and affordances,
as  well  as  because  of  the  direct  influence  of
their valence and intensity on an agent’s motiv-
ation (p. 12). Though subjects feel directly, in
order  to  report  their  feelings  they  have  to
“translate one mode of representation into an-
other,  with no guarantee that this translation
will  not  enrich or  modify FS intentional  con-
tent”  (p.  12).  Subjects  might  reinterpret  and
mis-describe  their  feelings,  but  they  cannot
thereby  change  the  nature  of  those  feelings
(feelings being cognitively impenetrable; p. 19).
Feelings are argued to be a plausible can-
didate for a natural kind on the basis of  the
comparison  between  feelings  and  emotions—
which she considers not to constitute a natural
kind (Proust this collection, p. 3). Two kinds of
subjective appraisal might be part of an emo-
tion: primary feelings on the one hand and ap-
praisals cum conative dispositions on the other.
While the first  kind corresponds to an earlier
time in our evolutionary development, is inde-
pendent of concepts, induces specific responses,
and  possesses  distinct  somatic  markers,  the
second kind is not and might be a blend of dif-
ferent  instances  of  the  first  kind.  Apart  from
primary  affective  feelings,  somatic,  agentive,
and metacognitive feelings are argued to form a
natural kind.
The function of feelings is to non-concep-
tually evaluate and signal the result of a com-
parison process between prediction and outcome
through embodied experience (Proust this col-
lection, p. 4). Due to their non-conceptual mon-
itoring  nature,  feelings  do  not  convey,  but
merely  approximate a causal  relation  between
internal states, external states, and actions (p.
11).  There  are three  kinds  of  functional  rela-
tions between feelings and actions (pp. 4–5):
1. Determination  of  a  kind  of  action  in  re-
sponse: approach vs. avoidance
2. Specific  orientation  in  time:  predictive  vs.
retrospective
3. Level  of  arousal:  elevation  in  energy  vs.
soothing effect
Feelings are argued to be the result of a  com-
parator or control mechanism that is automatic
and  encapsulated.  The latter  requirements  are
imposed in order to explain the independence of
feelings  of  beliefs  and  intentions  (p.  5)  such
that, e.g., one could still feel the adrenalin rush
even though the hypothesized venomous snake
turned out to be a twig. 
Metacognitive feelings (M-feelings) are held
to  express  informational,  instead  of  environ-
mental  affordances,  arise  in  mental  acts,  and
trigger similar actions of approach or avoidance.
M-feelings involve appraisal of the properties of
the informational processes underlying contents
of  thought,  but not  those content themselves.
Against  Schachter & Singer’s (1962) two-factor
theory of emotions (interpreted as feelings pos-
sessing intrinsic arousal but extrinsic valence),
Proust  argues  that  feelings  have  intrinsic  in-
tensity and valence. Cues on which those feel-
ings are based can be conveyed verbally though,
and thus, the heuristics (implicitly or explicitly)
might change in the long run. The main claim is
thus that context-dependency is not concept-de-
pendency (Proust this collection, p. 17). Experi-
ence of tokens of feelings differs with respect to
the kind of affordance they express (several af-
fordances might be linked to the same type of
feeling) and actions they trigger. 
An especially interesting claim for me is
that affective feeling in general, and metacognit-
ive feelings in particular, have a meta-monitor-
ing function of signalling “the rate of reduction
of  discrepancy toward a confidence threshold”
(Proust this collection, p. 21). If the rate of dis-
crepancy  reduction  is  above  expected,  the
valence of a feeling is experienced as more posit-
ive, and, if  below expected, as more negative.
“Cold”  feelings  without  valence  are  those  for
which  the  expectation  has  been  correct.  This
claim is interesting for two reasons. On the one
hand, to the reader familiar with the self-decep-
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tion  literature  the  key-concept  “confidence
threshold” will stand out. It plays an important
role in accounts of self-deception that regard it
as a kind of hypothesis testing (one prominent
proponent of this view is  Mele 2012). In short,
according to this type of account, gathering of
evidence  in  favour  of  a  certain  hypothesis  is
pursued  up  to  a  certain  point:  up  until  the
amount  of  evidence  has  reached  a  confidence
threshold that is enough to push an acceptance
or rejection of the hypothesis (for more see Pli-
ushch &  Metzinger 2015). On the other hand,
“prediction error”, or difference between predic-
tion and sensory input, is the key-term in the
model of mental representation that has lately
gained a large amount of acceptance—predictive
coding (for a short introduction to the free-en-
ergy principle  of  which predictive  coding is  a
particular implementation see Friston 2009; see
also  Clark,  Hohwy,  Seth this collection).  Pre-
dictive coding provides a unifying explanation
for perception, cognition, and action as a result
of  hierarchical  Bayesian  inference:  at  different
levels, predictions are compared to propagated
precision-weighted prediction error that, under
different conditions, leads either to changes in
the model of causes of sensory input or to ac-
tion  directed  at  testing  the  current  model
(Clark 2013). 
The idea that feelings signal the rate of re-
duction of prediction error might be worth elab-
orating in the predictive coding framework, par-
ticularly given the recent study by  Furl et al.
(2010)  who  argue  that  facial  expressions  are
represented  as  anticipated  trajectories of  the
change of those expressions: pictures of neutral
and fearful faces were morphed to different de-
grees such that participants got to see trajector-
ies  from a  neutral  to  a  fearful  face  and  vice
versa. After seeing such a sequences of pictures,
participants  had  to  rate  another  picture  for
fearfulness. The results indicated that predict-
able  sequences  in  which  the  degree  of  being
morphed rose or fell monotonously, thus form-
ing a trajectory, biased perception (Furl et al.
2010, p. 696). Combining Proust’s idea with the
results of Furl et al.’s study: feelings might also
be  represented  as  anticipated  trajectories  of
change, particularly given the possibly bi-direc-
tional causal influence between feelings and fa-
cial expressions (see section 2.2).
2 Critique: Affect and implicit heuristics 
in feelings
2.1 Use of the term “affect”
The aim of this section is threefold: 1) show dif-
ficulties in disentangling feelings from emotions;
2) attempt to give a more precise characterisa-
tion of the formal object of feelings, along with
some examples; 3) criticize the use of the term
“direct” and offer another definition that is con-
sistent with predictive coding. The first prob-
lematic point that I see is Proust’s use of the
term “affective”, which is ambiguous. She em-
ploys at least two different definitions of “affect-
ive”:
1. Feelings that possess valence (p. 20). Yet all
kinds of feelings, according to Proust, possess
affect and valence1 (p. 1). Given her distinc-
tion between “hot” (emotional) feelings and
those  that  have valence2 (p.  21),  emotional
feelings might differ from mere feelings with
valence  due  to  the  differently-experienced
valence,  maybe if  emotional  valence were a
richer experience. Thus, the question is about
the minimal requirements on valence and in-
tensity in feelings.
2. Feelings that express emotions. 
3. Difference between feelings and emotions:  if
agentive  and  metacognitive  feelings  can  be
affective,  then the categorization of feelings
into bodily, agentive, metacognitive, and af-
fective (p.  5)  might  be better  restricted to
the first three,  with the fourth being a di-
mension along which they vary. If affective in
this  categorization  means  emotional  (p.  2),
then there is an ambiguity of terms—affect-
1 The following quotations might help to elucidate the matter: “[f]eel-
ings typically express affect and valence in sensation (25-26), all the
feelings vary in affect in roughly the same way, because they all in-
clude valence in their informational structure” (p. 20).
2 In Proust’s words, the difference between “hot” feelings and feelings
with valence, on the example of M-feelings, is that “although all M-
feelings do not often have a definite ‘hot’ quality comparable with
fear and love, they always have a valence, according to whether they
predict the agent’s progress toward or away from her cognitive goal”
(p. 21).
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ive = having valence and affective = being
part of an emotional experience—because the
latter seems to be more complex.
4. Difference between formal objects of feelings
and  emotions:  if  “feelings  are  affective  in-
gredients  in  emotional  awareness”  (p.  3),
then there is a circularity in understanding
affectivity here: feelings are affective in virtue
of  being  part  of  an  emotion,  while  at  the
same time they themselves are the affective
component in the emotion of which they are
part. The first part of this claim can be fol-
lowed from that defended by Proust, namely
that feelings that do not express emotions are
not affective (p. 2). The second part of the
claim follows from Proust’s claim that feel-
ings are affective ingredients of emotions (p.
3).  As  elaborated  in  the  previous  section,
emotions are said by Proust to contain one of
two kinds of subjective appraisals: feelings or
appraisals cum conative dispositions. Further,
if  feelings are components of  emotions,  but
both can have a formal object, then those ob-
jects might diverge. The consequence is that
an emotion and a feeling that is part of it
might be directed at different objects. Thus,
Proust on the one hand distinguishes feelings
from emotions  and  yet  on  the  other  hand
claims that not only emotional feelings, but
also  agentive  and  metacognitive  feelings
might be “feeling toward” experiences (p. 3,
pp. 20–21). The latter claim that both feel-
ings and emotions are directed at intentional
objects  has  been  used  as  an  argument  to
identify both (see de Sousa 2014 section 2 for
a discussion of this question). Given Proust’s
claim that there are somatic, affective, agent-
ive, and metacognitive feelings, and given the
claim that at least in metacognitive feelings
the formal object is not the cognitive disposi-
tion itself but the rate of change of its execu-
tion above or below discrepancy, an interest-
ing question focuses on the formal object of
emotional  feelings.3 For  example,  can  it  be
3 To be more precise, the question is about the functional description
of the formal object of  feelings.  Proust (this collection) says that
“[f]eelings express […] affordance as their focus (for formal object),
along with its graded valence, ranging from very unpleasant to very
pleasant, and with its intensity gradient, which ranges from small to
large” (p. 8). Affordance is defined as “perceived utility”, and can be
that while the formal object of the emotion
of fear is some dangerous object, the object
of a feeling is a rate of change in the assess-
ment  of  the  situation  before  and  after  the
change of the formal object of an emotion?
This might explain why, e.g., the first bite of
a bar of  chocolate makes one happier than
the following bites. 
5. Bodily  phenomenology  of  feelings  as  their
formal  object:  Proust argues that  while  so-
matic  feelings  are  about  bodily  sensations
(or, more consistently, about the rate of their
change), in affective (emotional) and possibly
metacognitive feelings “the bodily phenomen-
ology tends to recede to the fringe of  con-
sciousness”  (this collection,  p.  2).  The  ex-
ample  that  Proust  gives  with  respect  to
metacognitive feelings is that feelings of re-
membering are correlated with but not about
facial muscle activity (p. 3). Proust acknow-
ledges that there might be mixed cases (ex-
perience of bodily feeling + intentional con-
tent, pp. 2–3), but I want to argue that in
some emotional  feelings  bodily  phenomeno-
logy is, to borrow a metaphor, in the  fore-
ground.  There  might  be  emotional  feelings
whose objects are bodily sensations, e.g., the
anxiety  that  arises  during  a  panic  attack:
when I concentrate on my accelerated heart-
beat, then if I come to associate the heart-
beat with some threatening aspects of a situ-
ation, such an experience might lead to anxi-
ety, and thus the initial anxiety leads to even
more  anxiety,  leading  to  a  vicious  cycle  of
panic (for a discussion of heartbeat percep-
tion in  panic disorder  see  Ehlers &  Breuer
1996). This might be a case of an emotion
whose formal object is the rate of change of
bodily  sensations,  or  maybe  a  meta-feeling
(for a discussion of meta-emotions see Mend-
onça 2013). 
In  the  given  panic  example  it  might  have
seemed  as  if  I  had  embraced  the  analogy
between  feelings  and  perception  that  Proust
positive or negative (ibid., p. 7). Positivity and negativity are dimen-
sions along which valence changes, and valence has been character-
ised as  the rate  of  change of  discrepancy towards  the (cognitive)
goal. For more on why the latter characterisation is interesting see
section 3.
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denies, so I will explain why it may be more be-
neficial  to  use  the  term  “direct”  in  another
sense to that used by Proust.  Proust makes a
sharp distinction between feeling and perceiv-
ing:  “[w]hile  percepts  allow  recognition  and
identification of external objects and properties,
feelings  express  specific  affordances  in  a  per-
ceived,  imagined,  or  remembered  situation”
(this collection, p. 10). Non-conceptual parts of
perceptions are said to relate to “objective, ex-
ternal contrastive cues” (Proust this collection,
p. 10), while in feelings they relate to evaluative
states. Perception is said to involve “direct sens-
ory access to the world” (p. 10), while the ac-
cess  of  feelings to the world and the body is
claimed to be indirect. Proust’s evidence for a
disanalogy  between  feeling  and  perception  is
based on the neuroscientific research of Barrett
& Bar, who say that absence of “internal affect-
ive context”  impairs  the categorization of  ob-
jects (2009, p. 12).4 Their evidence for this hy-
pothesis  is  based  on  reviewing  the  anatomic
connections involved in affective processing and
that of object perception. One critique of this
might be that the time of activation of certain
regions responsible for emotional processing and
perception  might  justify  the  claim  that  emo-
tional processing comes before perception, but
not how direct such processing is. Moreover, in
light of predictive coding, perception, emotion,
and  cognition  might  all  be  indirect  (Hohwy
2014; for more technical elaboration  Friston et
al. 2014).  In  other  words,  predictive  coding
provides the term “direct” with a meaning other
than that used by Proust. In predictive coding
directness  is  an  absence  of  the  evidentiary
boundary,  where  the  evidentiary  boundary  is
the  inferential  isolation  between the  model  of
the world and the hidden causes of sensory in-
put (Hohwy 2014). This means that causes bey-
ond the boundary have to be inferred on the
basis of independent evidence (ibid., p. 6), or, in
Hohwy’s words, “[t]he brain doing the inference
is  secluded at  least  in  the  sense  that  certain
4 Barrett & Bar (2009) define affect as an influence on bodily states
that is either unconscious or, if conscious, experienced as pleasurable
or unpleasurable to varying degrees (pp. 1327–1328). Barrett & Bar’s
(2009) basic claim is that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) integrates
into a unified multimodal representation sensory information from
both world and body in a dynamic way.
kinds of doubt about the occurrence of the evid-
ence  are  unanswerable  without  further,  inde-
pendent evidence” (p. 7). Relating this observa-
tion to Proust, on the premise of accepting pre-
dictive coding, there might not be a sharp dis-
tinction between feeling and perceiving such as
Proust postulates, or at least not in the form
presented in the target article. If interoception
as perception involves inferences about circum-
stances  beyond the  (same)  evidentiary  bound-
ary, as suggested by Hohwy (2014), then feeling
and perceiving would both be indirect (to the
same degree).5 If interoception does not go bey-
ond the evidentiary boundary, feelings might be
direct, even if perception is not.
2.2 Concept-based feelings?
In this part of the review I will point out the
dangers  of  interpreting  the  relation  between
feelings and concepts too simplistically and ar-
gue that it is possible that at least some kinds
of  feelings are influenced by concepts,  even if
they themselves are non-conceptual.  Proust ar-
gues that for metacognitive feelings to arise an
important  affordance,  as  well  as  an  implicit
heuristic, has to be present (this collection, p.
18). This heuristic is based on cues about the
dynamics of information processing, but not its
contents (p. 15). The dichotomies that Proust
uses  in  the  description—implicit–explicit,  un-
conscious–conscious,  evolutionarily-old–evolu-
tionarily-new, associative–rule-based (pp. 3-4, p.
17)—have often been mapped onto two different
kinds  of  processes  in  dual  processing  theory
(e.g.,  Frankish & Evans 2009). Dual processing
theory states that there are two kinds of pro-
cessing that possess the dichotomous character-
istics mentioned above. A minimal description
provided by  Evans (2009) for type 1 is  “fast,
automatic, high processing capacity, low effort”,
and for type 2 “slow, controlled, limited capa-
city, high effort” (p. 33). Along these lines, “im-
plicit”, “unconscious”, “evolutionarily old”, “as-
sociative” have been also used as descriptors for
type 1 and “explicit”, “conscious”, “evolutionar-
5 One could also ask whether the same evidentiary boundaries would
be involved in feeling and perceiving, since there could be many of
them (Friston 2013).
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ily new”, “rule-based” as descriptors for type 2.
A belief  bias  (accepting  more  believable  than
unbelievable conclusions) might serve as an ex-
ample for  type 1 (ibid.,  p.  41),  and the con-
scious correction thereof for type 2. The worry I
have  is  adding  to  those  dichotomies  another
one: non-conceptual (meaning in this case non-
propositional;  Proust this collection, p. 7)–con-
ceptual (propositional, belief-like). Proust holds
that “cues (associative heuristics)  dictate how
an  affordance  is  detected,  assessed  and  ex-
ploited in a context, but these cues are not con-
sciously available, and hence do not depend on
a naïve theory of the task” (p. 17). This infer-
ence is not valid in the given form. I agree with
Proust that “[a]  cue-based,  non-analytic heur-
istic is not inferential in the interpretive, first-
person sense” (p. 17), but I hold that there is at
least one step to consider in between non-con-
ceptual6 affordances and consciously evaluated
affordances.  And  this  is  automatic  concept-
based activation (the existence of automatic ap-
praisal is acknowledged by Proust; footnote 7). 
Evans (2009) distinguishes between differ-
ent  kinds  of  dual  processing  theories,  among
which are the sequential  (first  automatic  pro-
cessing, then controlled) and the parallel theory.
Proust seems to embrace a sequential  kind of
dual processing theory, given the functional role
she  ascribes  to  metacognitive  feelings  (evalu-
ation of mental actions before and after their
execution;  Proust 2013).  Yet  how far  implicit
heuristics  are  independent  of  concepts  is  in
question. Proust (this collection) denies that “a
concept-based interpretation will affect the ex-
perienced feeling itself” (p. 17). As mentioned
in section 1, she also denies that feelings have a
conceptual  format.  Thus,  she  seems  to  deny
both  that  concepts  play  a  causal  role  in  the
emergence  of  feelings  and that  feelings  them-
selves possess a conceptual format. I will briefly
demonstrate that the term “implicit heuristic”
does not preclude automatic concept activation,
if it implies the activation of knowledge or goal
representations.  Thompson (2009)  argues  that
6 Among those who agree with Proust that the content of epistemic
feelings is non-conceptual and non-metarepresentational are, for ex-
ample,  Michaelian &  Arango-Muñoz (2014).  But the  content  of a
metacognitive feeling being non-conceptual  does not preclude that
concepts play a causal role in its emergence.
heuristic  processes  are  contaminated  by back-
ground knowledge, as well as by beliefs and ex-
pectations  (p.  172,  p.  174).  Frankish (2009)
notes  that  “the  concepts  of  belief  and  desire
correspond  to  the  psychologist’s  concepts  of
knowledge (or memory) and goal structure” (p.
91).  Hence,  activation  of  knowledge that  may
provide the  context  for  feelings could also  be
conceptual. Goal representations might also be
activated  in  the  course  of  context  creation,
provided that unconscious goal pursuit is flex-
ible  and  context-sensitive  (Aarts &  Custers
2012).  Further,  unconsciously  activated  goals
not only depend on context, but also create con-
text  by  influencing  the  accessibility  of  know-
ledge,  evaluations,  and  emotions  (Fishbach &
Ferguson 2007, p. 496). It follows that if goal
representations are activated, then they might
lead to the activation of conceptual knowledge.
Another interesting point is that if  there is  a
continuous  interplay  between  goal  representa-
tions and affordances (opportunities in the en-
vironment; Huang & Bargh 2014, p. 125) and if
goal representations can change the experience
of the world (ibid., p. 124), then goal represent-
ations might change sensing of affordances and,
hence, the feelings associated with it. Further,
there  has  been  a  proposal  to  distinguish
between associative and rule-based processes by
the  kind  of  architecture  they  operate  upon:
namely connectionist vs. classical computational
(for  a  short  discussion  see  Samuels 2009,  pp.
141–142). Thus, implicit heuristics might be un-
derstood as certain connected representations in
a network being activated by some cues, where
the  question  is  about  the  representational
format of such knowledge, or a more precise de-
scription of the relational nature of the feeling
affordance. Last, a general note about the simil-
arity between feelings and other kinds of repres-
entations:  if  Bliss-Moreau &  Williams (2014)
are correct in defending the claim that all kinds
of representations possess an affective compon-
ent (valence + arousal in their definition), then
affect is something that expressive and concep-
tual representations share.
Of course, Proust’s claim that in the case
of  feelings  those  cues  relate  to the  dynamics,
but not to the contents of processes, indicates a
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more specific understanding of the kind of im-
plicit heuristic in question. My point, though, is
that if humans can “enrich their noetic feelings
through concepts, and thereby revise their reli-
ance  on  fluency  where  it  is  not  justified”
(Proust 2013, p. 144), then in humans implicit
heuristics  may also be  influenced  by concepts
(in an automatic way) and in such a way influ-
ence feelings. Needless to say, the independent
existence of such a schema (be it cognitive or
emotional) is hard to prove (Eysenck & Keane
2010,  p.  597).  According  to  Koriat &  Levy-
Sadot (1999), as cited by Proust (this collection,
p. 15), metacognitive feelings arise as a result of
nonanalytic  inferential  processes  (described  as
the implicit or unconscious application of heur-
istics), in distinction to the direct memory trace
hypothesis, according to which feelings have dir-
ect access  to memory traces  (Koriat &  Levy-
Sadot 1999,  p.  487).  Koriat &  Levy-Sadot
(1999) argue that the presence of dissociations
between  knowing  and  the  feeling  of  knowing
speaks against  the second hypothesis.  Even if
heuristics  in  feelings  are  non-conceptual,  the
fact  that  through  feelings  emotion  gets  its
valence necessitates that we consider how con-
cepts  and  memory  traces  influence  feelings,
given that they play a role in emotions. Lane et
al. (forthcoming), for example, argue that psy-
chotherapeutic change is made possible by up-
dating  prior  emotional  experiences,  for  which
memory traces of those experiences have to be
reactivated  and  reconsolidated.  Thus,  even  if
feelings are non-propositional (Proust this col-
lection, p. 20), activation of concepts and their
expression in propositional terms are to be dis-
tinguished. The point is not that metacognitive
feelings  themselves  cannot  have  indexical
formats,7 or that an agent could not possess ex-
pressive and conceptual representations at the
7 A better understanding of the indexical mode of feelings might be
provided by the following quotation: “Feelings can be seen as pre-
specified states of a comparator, which predict ultimate success or
failure in the actions that they monitor. Given that the information
they carry is immediately used in controlling and monitoring current
effort, it is misleading to present them as ‘reporting’ the epistemic
properties of a mental state or referring to it (even de re). They are,
rather,  signals  in  a  control  mechanism,  which  work somewhat  as
traffic lights do: allowing traffic, stopping it, rechanneling it; no re-
port or reference need be involved” (Proust 2013, p. 76). In another
place  Proust (2013) notes that feelings “do not properly ‘refer’, be-
cause they do not engage propositional thinking” (p. 77).
same time, but that in humans the generation
of (at least) metacognitive and emotional feel-
ings  might  be  preceded  by  an  automatic
concept activation that influences them. If this
is the case, then one could ask again whether
feelings are transparent (see section 1).
Further,  instead  of  describing  cognitive
processes as serial, their  dynamic (continuous)
nature might be more worthy of emphasis. In
the  target  article,  Proust mentions  that
“[i]ncreased activity in the smile muscle, the zy-
gomaticus major, produces feelings with a posit-
ive valence” (this collection, p. 15).  This sug-
gests that facial expression influences emotions.
She also argues for the transparency (impenet-
rable  nature) of  feelings and the against two-
factor theory, thus against the possibility that
appraisal influences the valence of feelings (see
section 1). I want to offer for clarification pur-
poses a short review of the recent literature on
which factors are supposed to influence feelings
and factors feelings influence themselves Rogers
et al. (2014) emphasize the dynamic nature of
emotions insofar as they depend on the social
appraisal of a situation. Brosch (2013) also em-
phasizes the dynamic nature of appraisal that
plays  a  causal  role  in  eliciting  emotions.  The
definition  of  appraisal  that  Brosch (2013)  ac-
cepts also encompasses low-level appraisal based
on learned schemata (p. 370). Brosch (2013) ar-
gues that first an initial low-level appraisal af-
fects  the  physiology  (1),  action  tendency  (2),
expression (3), and feeling (4) of an emotional
experience, and then those changes in turn af-
fect an on-going (low- and high-level) appraisal,
establishing an appraisal loop. Here, the direc-
tion  of  influence  is  still  in  question,  e.g.,
whether  feelings  influence  expressions  or  the
other way around.  Laird &  Lacasse (2014) de-
fend  the  James–Lange  theory  of  emotion,
namely  that  facial  expressions  (e.g.,  BOTOX
patients being less responsive to mild positive
emotional stimuli; for the reference see ibid., p.
29), expressive behaviour (e.g., romantic attrac-
tion as a result of shared, mutual gaze; ibid., p.
29), and visceral responses that are interpreted
according to situational cues (e.g.,  misattribu-
tion of emotion) are  causes of emotions (for a
critique  of  their  evidence  see  Reisenzein &
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Stephan 2014).  As  such,  they  may  influence
emotional  feelings  too,  which  Proust acknow-
ledges  by  pointing  out  the  causal  connection
between measures in facial muscles and affective
character of feelings (this collection, p. 25). Yet
the direction of influence may also go the other
way around (from feelings to facial expressions).
Thus,  the nature  of  feelings  may also  be dy-
namic, as are the nature of the underlying cog-
nitive  processes.  Interestingly,  Thagard &
Schröder (2014) argue for a neurocomputational
theory of emotions as semantic pointers (term
introduced  by  Chris  Eliasmith).  They  argue
that physiological, appraisal, social, and psycho-
logical  components  of  emotions  can  be  integ-
rated into one unified account: emotion tokens
can possess  both shallow and deep meanings.
The compressed (shallow) form of emotions is
reportable, while at the same time pointing to
the  uncompressed  deep  form  that  binds  to-
gether  situational,  physiological,  and appraisal
components. 
In  the  preceding  paragraph  I  considered
literature supporting the claim that feelings are
embedded  in  continuous  cognitive  processes.
The purpose of this was to show that how ap-
praisal might influence feelings in some form is
complex  and  might  even  be  circular.  In  this
paragraph  I  offer  some  additional  evidence
against  a  discontinuous  interpretation  of  the
connection  between  feelings  and  propositional
descriptions thereof. The existence of  affective
blindsight (ability to discern emotional stimuli
despite  inability to consciously perceive them;
Eysenck & Keane 2010, p. 581) would stand in
line  with  the  assumption  that  emotional  and
cognitive processing is based on different kinds
of information. This is because affective blind-
sight demonstrates the dissociation between two
different kinds of processing and, thus, a disso-
ciation between the information needed for the
one kind and for the other.  Further,  Scott et
al.’s (2014) experiment demonstrating  blind in-
sight (accurate  metacognitive  accuracy  in  the
absence of discriminative accuracy) on the one
hand supports  Proust’s  hypothesis  that  meta-
cognition and first-order cognition are not based
on the  same kind  of  information,  yet  on  the
other  it  speaks  against  a  serial  interpretation
according to which feelings arise  out  of  auto-
matic  processes  and  are  then  re-described  in
propositional terms and used in first-person in-
ferential reasoning. Liu & Wang (2014), for ex-
ample, argue that motivational intensity influ-
ences the effect of positive affect on cognitive
control: low-approach motivated positive affect
enhances cognitive flexibility and distractibility,
while  high-approach  motivated  positive  affect
(associated with goal pursuit) enhances cognit-
ive stability. Thus, the role of feelings might be
broader  than just  the  indicators  that  may or
may not be used in conscious reasoning.
3 Proposals: Tension in self-deception is
a kind of metacognitive feeling
Proust (this collection, as well as  2013) argues
that mental actions are preceded and followed
by metacognitive feelings indicating the appro-
priateness of the cognitive process in question. I
want to argue that tension in self-deception fits
the characterisation of a metacognitive feeling.
Tension is described as a feeling of uneasiness
and distress, and as such I think that it is pre-
cisely this tension that is said to indicate to the
self-deceiver  that  her  belief-forming process  is
faulty.
Self-deception  (SD)  is  a  motivated  (1)
kind of typically subpersonal hypothesis-testing
(2)  that  results  in  an  evidence-incompatible
mental representation of reality (3) which fulfils
a  belief-like  role  (4)  (Pliushch &  Metzinger
2015). Self-deception is usually discussed in the
context of biased belief-forming processes and it
is argued that phenomenological tension arises
as a result of  the execution of such processes
(e.g., Lynch 2012). Thus, the same function has
been ascribed to tension in self-deception as the
one ascribed  by Proust  to  metacognitive  feel-
ings, namely a comparison of the cognitive pro-
cess to certain criteria. In self-deception, ration-
ality criteria are typically emphasised.
I want to argue that metacognitive feelings
apply  to self-deception,  insofar  as  they might
also  monitor  unconscious cognitive  processes
and arise not only before or after a cognitive
process, but also during it. In case of self-decep-
tion these cognitive processes are belief-forming
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processes.  Proust (this collection,  2013)  con-
siders conscious mental actions: her argument is
that unconscious comparison processes that give
rise to metacognitive feelings precede and follow
conscious mental  actions.  She argues that the
“attentional-supervisory  system”  emerges  from
“distributed  metacognitive  abilities”  (Proust
2013,  p.  263).  Ignorance  of  epistemic  norms
such  as  relevance,  coherence,  fluency,  and  in-
formativeness  lead  to  (pathological)  errors  in
belief  acquisition  (Proust 2013,  pp.  260–261).
My  argument  in  favour  of  the  extension  of
metacognitive  feelings  to  monitor  unconscious
cognitive  processes  is  of  a  phenomenological
nature.  I  agree  with  Proust (this collection)
that the term “inference” has been used loosely
in the literature and does not always indicate a
first-person inference (p. 21). Yet the more ba-
sic problem might be that there is no sequential
first-person inference as such in the first place.
If the shift between mind wandering (task-unre-
lated cognitive activity) and task-directed cog-
nitive activity goes unnoticed (Metzinger 2013),
then there might be other shifts that we do not
notice, e.g., the shift from unconscious to con-
scious cognitive processes,  or some changes in
the given process. Thus, the phenomenology of
a cognitive process might be more complicated
than a unified sequence with a starting point
and an end. Further, given, for example, mood-
state  dependent  cognition  (Eysenck &  Keane
2010, pp. 584), I doubt the plausibility of the
assumption  that  only  in  breaks  between  con-
scious cognitive processes do subjects experience
affective feelings. 
In the previous paragraphs I argued that
the functional role of metacognitive feelings fits
that of tension in self-deception, and that meta-
cognitive feelings arise not only before and after
mental actions, but also before, after, and dur-
ing unconscious (possibly self-deceptive) cognit-
ive processes. In this paragraph I want to link
Proust’s idea that feelings possess valence only
if the rate of change of progress is unexpected
to predictive coding, in order to provide a func-
tional  description  of  metacognitive  feelings.
Proust (this collection) argues that the affective
quality  of  feelings  arises  only  if  the  cognitive
process  violates  expectations:  if  it  progresses
quicker towards the goal, positive feelings arise,
if slower, negative feelings arise8 (p. 21). Given
that  the  terms  “expectation”  and  “prediction
error” have gained popularity in virtue of being
key terms in predictive coding, which is a mod-
elling strategy explaining perception, cognition,
and action (Clark 2013), I will shortly discuss
Proust’s  claim  about  affect  in  metacognitive
feelings in the context of predictive coding. Ac-
cording to predictive coding,  prediction errors
(deviation  between  expectation  and  outcome)
are precision-weighted. Precision is the property
of  prediction  errors  (errors  between  the  top-
down prediction and the bottom-up signal one
receives) that can be described as the weight of
a prediction error that plays the role of selec-
tion: the more precise the prediction error, the
more it will change the hypothesis about causes
of input. Switching between perception and ac-
tion depends on the precision of prediction er-
rors:  precise  prediction  errors  change  hypo-
theses,  while  imprecise  ones  lead  to  action
(Brown et al. 2013). Precision9 is also argued to
play a dual biasing role: biasing perception to-
ward goal  states  and enhancing  confidence  in
action choices (Friston et al. 2013). Low preci-
sion  of  prediction  errors  has  been  argued  to
cause anxiety (Mathys et al. 2011, p. 17).10 I ar-
gue that Proust’s proposal that violations of ex-
pectations of “a given rate of reduction of the
discrepancies  toward  her  [agent’s]  cognitive
goal” (this collection, p. 26) produce affective
feelings might be described in predictive coding
terms as violations of  transition probabilities of
reaching the goal state:11 if a state conducive to
the goal  state or  a  goal  state itself  has been
reached, despite a low probability of changing
8 Note the analogy to the “dark room problem” in predictive coding: if
an agent wants to minimize surprise or prediction error, then she
should stay in a dark room, given that there will be no surprise in it
(e.g., Clark 2013). If there were no prediction error, this would cause
uncertainty (e.g., Friston et al. 2012). Proust’s argument is similar: if
there were no violations of expectations, then metacognitive feelings
would not have any valence, because they only have valence if the
rate of change is quicker or slower than expected. 
9 Attention is  precision optimization according  to predictive  coding
(Hohwy 2013).
10 Mathys et al. (2011) are also interesting for the given topic insofar as
Proust argues that the heuristics upon which metacognitive feelings
are based might be changed via associative learning;  Mathys et al.
(2011) provide a predictive coding model of reinforcement learning.
11 For a predictive-coding model of a goal-directed action see Friston et
al. (2013).
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into that state from the current state, then pos-
itive affective feelings might arise.12
The first step in the categorisation of ten-
sion as a metacognitive feeling has been an ex-
tention of the application of metacognitive feel-
ings  to  unconscious  belief-forming  processes.
The  second  is  to  clarify  the  representational
content of tension. To do the latter, it might be
beneficial  to  consider  which  other  kinds  of
metacognitive feelings arise out of belief-forming
processes. Those are intuitivity, counter-intuit-
ivity, and anxiety, if one classifies them accord-
ing to the phenomenology and not according to
the norm that they control. Intuitivity indicates
the  appropriateness  of  a  given  belief-forming
process.13 The reason for the ascription of the
given functional role to intuitivity is that intu-
ivitity signals 1) a good fit with respect to the
network of our explicit background beliefs and
2) a good fit with respect to our conscious and
unconscious  model  of  reality  (Metzinger &
Windt 2014).  An  appropriate  belief-forming
process provides a good fit with respect to 1)
and highly likely also with respect to 2). I fur-
ther  argue  that  counter-intuitivity  represents
that  a  certain  cognitive  process  violates  the
chosen criterion of appropriateness, but is neut-
ral with respect to the system’s goal representa-
tions, while tension or anxiety represents that
the cognitive process violates at least some im-
portant goal representations. The reason for this
distinction is to account for the effect of motiva-
tion on belief-forming processes. 
Thus,  if  feelings  accompany  our  belief-
forming processes, then readers might have ex-
perienced some while reading this commentary:
hence the title. To conclude, I think that Proust
has offered interesting ideas  on the nature of
feelings that will greatly contribute to the clari-
12 Emotional valence has been also argued to be modelled as the rate of
change of free energy: Instead of estimating volatility or “slow and
continuous changes in states of the world” the rate of change of free
energy is argued to take that role of estimating (known) uncertainty
(Joffily & Coricelli 2013, p. 1). Here Joffily & Coricelli (2013) accept
Yu & Dayan’s (2005) distinction between expected and unexpected
uncertainty: Expected uncertainty is the one about known unreliabil-
ity of predicting relationships  within a context and unexpected un-
certainty is the one about the appropriateness of the context itself
such that when unexpected uncertainty is high, it is a signal that a
context switch should be made.
13 For an elaboration on the phenomenal signature of knowing in intu-
itions of certainty, see Metzinger & Windt (2014).
fication of the matter: the indexical (affordance-
sensing and non-conceptual) format of feelings,
their  transparency,  the  taxonomy  of  feelings
into sensory, emotional, agentive, and epistemic,
the predictive and retrospective function of feel-
ings signalling the appropriateness of the cog-
nitive process they monitor, and the degree of
change of expectation as the origin of valence of
feelings. In this review I have tried to extend
Proust’s  account.  To  do  this,  I  attempted  to
provide  some  conceptual  clarifications  on  the
distinction between feelings and emotions,  the
formal object of feelings, and the conceptual in-
fluences to which they might be subject. Last, I
argued that tension in self-deception is a kind of
metacognitive feeling. 
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